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Life as We Know It: The Expansion of the
Right to Life Under the Jurisprudence of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
ALEXANDRA R. HARRINGTON
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of protecting life1 within the context of human rights law
is perhaps elemental since, as the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights has explained on numerous occasions, without protecting life all
other human rights protections are meaningless.2 Indeed, a survey of
international and regional human rights treaties and conventions
demonstrates the uniformity of inclusion of the right to life, as a
guaranteed right, across divergent state parties and instrumentpromulgation goals.
And yet, the terms of the right to life and the construction of its
meaning do vary between instruments. For example, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights simply states that “[e]very
human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected
by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”3 By
comparison, the European Convention on Human Rights states that
“[e]veryone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a
sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this
penalty is provided by law.”4 Finally, the American Convention on
Human Rights states that “[e]very person has the right to have his life
respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the
moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”5
Of course, the meaning of these provisions depends not only on a plain
text reading but also on the construction of these provisions by the
appropriate international or regional body.
1. For the purposes of this article, the right to life is defined as extending to and protecting
individuals from birth onward. The article does not intend to take a position as to the applicability
of the right to life under the American Convention on Human Rights to the unborn.
2. Escué-Zapata v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 165 (July 4, 2007).
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), opened for signature Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
4. European Court of Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights art. 62(1),
opened up for signature 1950 (entered into force on June 1, 2010).
5. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 4, Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser4v/II 23, doc. 21, rev. 2 (1975).

313

314

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 35:313

This article focuses on the Inter-American Court of Human Right’s
(“Court”) creation of a body of jurisprudence regarding the right to life
that has expanded and become increasingly nuanced throughout the
Court’s history. The Court is selected for analysis because, as the Court
itself admits, it is at the forefront of developing human rights law.6 In
addition, the Court offers a strong example of how the right to life can
be used by a juridical body to reflect the many facets of life and to
holistically incorporate these facets into jurisprudence protecting life for
individuals and communities. Expanding the Court’s construction of the
right to life illustrates that the contours of life as we know it have
changed–and will change–to ensure that they reflect and protect the
intricate tapestry of human rights that are encompassed by the right to
life.
Part II of this article provides background on the Inter-American
human rights system, its foundational texts, and the institutional bodies
that are charged with protecting human rights throughout the region.
Part III then examines the right to life in the Court’s jurisprudence by
focusing on three main areas: 1) the textual right to life; 2) the
protective construction of the right to life; and 3) the right to life and
remedies. The section on the textual right to life discusses the essential
elements of the right to life as established by the American Convention
on Human Rights (“American Convention”). The section on the
protective construction of the right to life asserts that the Court has used
the right to life as a protective mechanism to expand the boundaries of
more traditional constructs of the right. In particular, the Court
identified vulnerable groups suffering from extreme violations of the
right to life and treated these violations as the parameters of the right.
Within the protective construction of the right to life are five subsections: 1) victims of forced disappearances; 2) victims of extrajudicial killings; 3) children as victims; 4) indigenous communities as
victims; and 5) prison inmates as victims.
In Part IV, the article examines trends in the Court’s shaping of the
right to life and the state of the right to life as we currently know it in
the Inter-American human rights system. Part IV also examines the
potential impact of cases currently pending before the Court on future
construction of the right to life. Ultimately, this article concludes with
the observation that the Court’s expansion of the right to life is essential
for maintaining the Inter-American human rights system as a vibrant
mechanism of jurisprudence on human rights.
6. Contreras et al. v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 232 (Aug. 31, 2011).
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II. INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM BACKGROUND
In order to understand and chart the development of the right to
life in the Inter-American context, it is essential to first understand the
Inter-American human rights system itself. The Inter-American human
rights system is a creation of the Organization of American States
(“OAS”). As one of the oldest regional organizations in the world, the
OAS has established a deeply entrenched connection between its
members despite the political and societal tensions that often flare
between them.7 Given the strength of this relationship, it is perhaps
unsurprising that the OAS has created law and policy in a number of
areas, ranging from human rights to the security of the environment.8
One of the bedrock documents for the OAS is the American
Convention, often referred to as the Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica. This
convention established the Inter-American human rights system as it
currently exists.9 Although the members of the OAS made an earlier
human rights statement in the American Declaration on Human
Rights,10 the American Convention codified the principles in the
American Declaration as a matter of law for State parties.11 In addition
to making these rights and duties legally binding on State parties, the
American Convention established the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (“Commission”) and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights as a bi-level system for addressing individual complaints
regarding the human rights practices of State parties.12
Under this system, the first institution to which an individual may
complain is the Commission.13 The complaint, which may be brought by
the affected individual, his representative, a human rights group, or an
affected community, must first pass an admissibility test.14 The
admissibility test requires that the complainant exhaust his remedies at
the domestic level,15 unless this is impossible or would result in a severe
threat to the complainant.16 Second, the complainant or the person who
7. Who We Are, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, available at
http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp (last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
8. Id.
9. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5.
10. O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States,
Mar. 30–May 2, 1948, OEA/Ser. L./ V/II.23/doc. 2 rev. 6 (English 1979).
11. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5.
12. Id. chs. VI–VIII.
13. Id. ch. VII.
14. Id. art. 44.
15. Id. art. 46.
16. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 4, Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser4v/II 23, doc. 21, rev. 2 (1975).
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has suffered the harm must be a citizen of a state that has both ratified
the American Convention and agreed to the jurisdiction of the
Commission and of the Court.17 Third, the alleged human rights abuse
must be justiciable under the American Convention.18 Fourth, the
complaint must not be pending before another international human
rights body.19 Finally, the allegation must not be frivolous.20 If these
hurdles are not met, the complaint will be dismissed.21 If they are met,
the complaint investigation will continue and the state party will have
the ability to provide the Commission with information regarding the
subject of the complaint.22
The Commission will typically issue recommendations to the
involved state party regarding the steps necessary to address or
otherwise remedy the complained of situation.23 In this way, the
Commission has a dual role as investigative entity and the source of
some remedial authority, although this authority does not carry the same
gravity as the Court.24 The Commission also has the ability to refer a
complaint to the Court. The Court may issue a judicial decision on the
existence of a potential violation, or it may decide the appropriate
reparations owed to the victim(s) of human rights violations.25 At this
level, the Commission will be involved in the judicial proceedings, as
will the State party and the individual complainants if they wish.26
The Court is tasked with evaluating the evidence presented and
deciding whether a violation of the American Convention occurred.27
Beyond this decision, the Court also has the ability to craft pecuniary
and, increasingly, non-pecuniary remedies and awards for the victims,
their families, and their communities.28 As discussed below, the Court,
through its decisions, has expanded the scope of the rights contained in
the American Convention in order to craft a system that provides greater
protections for individuals and communities as a whole.29
17. Id. art. 44.
18. Id.
19. Id. art. 46.
20. Id. art. 47.
21. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 4, Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser4v/II 23, doc. 21, rev. 2 (1975).
22. Id. art. 48.
23. Id. arts. 48, 51.
24. Id. arts. 48–51.
25. Id. art. 48.
26. Functions and Powers, INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/functions.asp (last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
27. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note, at art. 63.
28. Id. art. 63.
29. For an in-depth discussion of these remedies see Alexandra R. Harrington,
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The Court has also become increasingly adept at crafting holistic
remedies, such as the erection of statues in honor of victims and
ordering State parties to make public statements of responsibility for
human rights violations. These remedies address not only the financial
loss involved in human rights violations, but also the larger need for
society to be made aware of these violations and to come to terms with
them as part of the healing process.30 This has been especially important
in cases of forced disappearances where the victim’s family and
community are typically unable to receive an answer as to the
whereabouts and fate of the victim. Forced disappearances are a way of
hiding human rights violations from the community and instilling fear at
the same time.31
Before continuing on to any further analysis it must be noted that
the decisions of the Court are not binding. In contrast to decisions of
domestic courts, they cannot automatically be enforced against the State
party in the domestic realm.32 However, the Court’s decisions hold a
great deal of weight at the international and domestic level and have
resulted in many important changes to domestic law and human rights
practices.33 In addition, the Court’s decisions and findings are important
sources of validation and identity for the many marginalized groups,
such as indigenous communities and incarcerated children, which have
brought successful claims before the Court.34
III. THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN THE INTER-AMERICAN
COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE
Throughout its jurisprudential history, the Court has used multiple
visions of the right to life in order to weave an expansive and
meaningful application of the right. In order to understand this
jurisprudence, this Part is broken into three sections: 1) the textual right
to life; 2) the protective construction of the right to life; and 3) the right
to life and remedies–so that the full application and construction of the
right to life can be appreciated.
A. The Textual Right to Life
The American Convention articulates the right to life as follows:
Institutionalizing Human Rights in Latin America: The Role of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights System, TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. (forthcoming).
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. American Convention on Human Rights art. 62(3), supra note 5.
33. See Harrington, Institutionalizing Human Rights in Latin America, supra note 29.
34. See id.
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1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This
right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the
moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his life.35
The remainder of the right to life provision in the American
Convention specifically targets the death penalty, focusing on the
conditions surrounding its use, with the ultimate goal of abolishing the
death penalty within State penal systems.36 While this is certainly an
important issue at the domestic and international level, the focus of this
article is solely on section 1 of the right to life provision since the Court
has steadily expanded it.
Facially, the terms of the right to life are rather nebulous. The right
can be construed very narrowly to apply solely in the criminal context,
or it can be construed more broadly to protect the right to life in a
societal context.37 It is within the latter context that the Court has
expanded the right to life, and the understanding of what life is, in order
to protect individuals and communities as well as to protect the sanctity
of life as holistic concept.
B. Protective Construction of the Right to Life
As a threshold matter, the Court has consistently found that acts
such as the imposition of the death penalty and certain human rights
abuses that occur in the accepted penal law context are violations of the
right to life.38 In this sense, the Court has endorsed and upheld the
standard way in which many courts, particularly human rights courts,
apply the right to life.39
However, early in its jurisprudence the Court went beyond this
traditional construction and began to expand the right beyond the
criminal context.40 Perhaps the most important explanation of the right
35. American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(1), supra note 5.
36. See generally id. art. 4.
37. See generally id.
38. See Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94 (June 21, 2002); Fermin
Ramirez v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
126 (June 20, 2005); Raxcacó-Reyes v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 133 (Sept. 15, 2005); Boyce et al. v. Barbados, Preliminary
Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 169 (Nov.
20, 2007); Dacosta-Cadogan v. Barbados, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 204 (Sept. 24, 2009).
39. See id.
40. See Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101 (Nov. 25, 2003); Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay,
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to life in the Inter-American human rights system was offered by the
Court in the Mack Chang case,41 in which it explained that “the right to
life plays a fundamental role in the American Convention because it is a
prior condition for the realization of the other rights. When the right to
life is not respected, all other rights lack meaning.”42 This revolutionary
pronouncement allowed the Court to significantly expand the place of
the right to life within its jurisprudence and within the construct of the
Inter-American human rights system as a whole.
As a corollary, the Court has created both positive and negative
State responsibilities in terms of implementing and upholding the right
to life within the domestic context. Specifically, the Court has explained
that the right to life requires not only that no person be arbitrarily
deprived of her life (negative obligation), but also that the States adopt
all appropriate measures to protect and preserve the right to life
(positive obligation), under their duty to ensure full and free exercise of
the rights by all persons under their jurisdiction.43
The duality of the right to life has become essential to the Court in
its analysis of cases involving the right to life throughout a wide range
of policy areas. Overall, the idea of the right to life as the cornerstone of
human rights protections has translated into several particular policy
areas that address the vulnerable and societally marginalized—
particularly the below-discussed groups.
1. Victims of Forced Disappearances
Throughout the history of the Court and its jurisprudence, the
practice of forced disappearances was, and continues to be,
systematically used by many State parties as a way to silence political,
social or other dissent;44 target and harm certain, particularly vulnerable,
groups;45 stamp out political insurrections and perceived disloyalty to
the governing regime;46 and generally intimidate the larger community

Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 (June 17, 2005).
41. See Myrna Mack-Chang, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 101, supra note 40, at 92.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 92–93.
44. See, e.g., La Cantuta v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 162 (Nov. 29, 2006); Contreras et al. v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 232 (Aug. 31, 2011).
45. See, e.g., Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 212 (May 25, 2010); Escué-Zapata v.
Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 165 (July 4,
2007).
46. See, e.g., Ibsen-Cárdenas and Ibsen-Peña v. Bolivia, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 217 (Sept. 1, 2010); Gomes-Lund et al. (Guerrilha de
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from which the person was disappeared.47 The hallmarks of forced
disappearances are uncertainty as to: the location of the person
disappeared, whether the person is still alive, and whether the person
has been or is being subjected to torture.48
These elements of forced disappearances are certainly damaging to
the victim, but they also have direct and devastating effects on the
victim’s family and community.49 More than conjecture or supposition,
the Court uses the familial, community-based damages and negative
impacts of forced disappearances to justify the imposition of nonpecuniary remedies. These remedies include physical and mental health
services for family members scarred by the disappearance,50 and
educational opportunities for family members forced to leave school as
a result of economic and physical hardship after the victim was
disappeared.51 Additionally, the Court has noted the direct and
stigmatizing impact on indigenous communities, where members—
particularly leaders or activists connected to them—have been
disappeared, because of the overall vulnerability of these communities
in law and society.52 Thus, in addition to the victim himself, forced
disappearances impact the family of the victim and the community in
which the victim lived.53
Given the reality of the impact of forced disappearances, it is
perhaps unsurprising that the Court has regularly found the practice
itself to constitute a violation of the victim’s right to life. More than
that, however, the Court has extended the relationship between forced
disappearances and the right to life, holding that the right does not end
Araguaia) v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 219 (Nov. 24, 2010); González-Medina and relatives v. Dominican
Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 240 (Feb. 27, 2012).
47. See, e.g., 19 Tradesmen v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109 (July 5, 2004).
48. See, e.g., id.; La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162 (Nov. 29, 2006); Escué-Zapata v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 165 (July 4, 2007); Contreras et al. v. El
Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 232 (Aug.
31, 2011); Chitay Nech, supra note 45; Ibsen-Cárdenas and Ibsen-Peña v. Bolivia, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, supra note 45; Gomes-Lund et al. (Guerrilha do Araguaia) v. Brazil,
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 219 (Nov. 24, 2010); González-Medina and Relatives v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, supra note 46.
49. Harrington, supra note 29, at 15.
50. Id. at 23–24, 28–29.
51. Id. at 26.
52. Id. at 17.
53. See id.
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with the death of the disappeared individual victim.54 For example, the
Court has established that practices such as hiding the bodies of those
who have been disappeared and then killed to constitute a violation of
the right to life. This is especially so where hiding involved
dismemberment and burial with the purpose of ensuring that the family
could not find the victim.55
As a corollary to this, the Court has ordered that the bodies of the
disappeared be exhumed by the State and returned to their families
based on the finding that secreting bodies away was part of the ongoing
violation of the right to life.56 In this situation, it was not sufficient for
the State to admit that the disappeared victim had been killed in order to
attempt a remedy of the violation.57 Instead, the State was required to
physically return the remains to the family for proper burial, thereby
expanding the right to life to include the honoring of the extinguished
life with dignity in death.58
A good example of this is the Cotton Field case from the area of
Ciudad Juarez, Mexico.59 In that case, there was an established pattern
of violence against women and girls and a persistent failure to
investigate or to prevent this type of violence.60 The police and
prosecution within the Ciudad Juarez area acted—or failed to act—in a
way which allowed the victims to suffer sexual violence, torture and
death while they were disappeared.61 In essence, the Court found that
the State authorities fostered a culture of impunity for acts of violence
against women and girls that caused the victims to suffer a violation of
their right to life.
Once a deceased victim’s remains were found, the investigation
system in use in Ciudad Juarez failed the victims and their families. The
Court took particular exception to the practice of State actors impugning
the victims and threatening their families in order to convince them not
to pursue the case further.62 These actions amounted to a continuing
violation of the right to life that began with the disappearance of the
54. 19 Tradesmen v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, supra note 47, ¶¶ 154–56.
55. Id.
56. Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 90 (Dec.
6, 2001); Ibsen-Cárdenas and Ibsen-Peña v. Bolivia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, supra note
45, at ¶ 242.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009).
60. See generally id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
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victims.63 Further, the Court asserted that the failure of the State to
ensure a vigorous prosecution of those alleged to be responsible was
also violation of the victim’s right to life.64
The Court’s handling of forced disappearance within the frame of
the right to life can be seen as asserting that respect for the right to life
is an inferential part of the right itself. The Court’s jurisprudence also
evidences that respect for the right to life continues to exist and be
justiciable even after the victim has perished. This link is also supported
throughout the development of the Court’s jurisprudence in other areas.
It affirms the assertion that the Court has evolved an understanding of
life as we know it that is far more holistic than a facial reading of the
American Convention might suggest.
Recent cases decided by the Court have established a near
presumption of state actor or quasi-state actor involvement in forced
disappearances. These cases provide detailed descriptions of the
regimes under which the alleged disappearances occurred, such as in
Bolivia,65 the Dominican Republic,66 El Salvador67 and Uruguay.68
Forced disappearances were a typical state practice and these cases
provide detailed descriptions of the forms of torture used on those who
were disappeared and held in secret confinement by the particular
regime.69
2. Victims of Extra-judicial Killings
In the context of Court jurisprudence, the term “extra-judicial
killing” refers to the process of state actors (or imputed/quasi-state
actors) killing individuals without a trial or other hallmarks of
legitimate judicial process, regardless of whether judicially sanctioned
imposition of the death penalty is legally permitted in the state in
question.70 Extra-judicial killings have often been, and continue to be,
used to target or send a message to a particular group, community, or
constituency.71 In many instances, however, they have been carried out
63. See id. ¶ 388.
64. See González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009).
65. See Ibsen-Cardenas and Ibsen Pena, supra note 46, ¶¶ 50–56.
66. See Gonzalez-Medina, supra note 46, ¶¶ 137–44.
67. See Contreras, supra note 44, ¶¶ 40–55.
68. See Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits, Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
221, ¶ 388 (Feb. 24, 2011).
69. See Ibsen-Cardenas and Ibsen Pena, supra note 46, ¶ 54.
70. See id. ¶¶ 49–56; Gonzalez-Medina, supra note 46, ¶¶ 139–44; Contreras, supra note 44,
¶¶ 40–55; Gelman, supra note 68, ¶¶ 44–63.
71. Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 11, ¶¶
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randomly and arbitrarily.72 The victims of these killings range from
those who seemingly did nothing wrong other than be in a particular
place at a particular time, to human rights campaigners or indigenous
community leaders because of the state perception that they constituted
a threat to its established order.73 What all these victims have in
common is that they were killed as a result of some form of concerted
action on the part of the state or state sponsored actors.
As with forced disappearances, the Court, perhaps unsurprisingly,
has found that the act of extra-judicial killing is a violation of the right
to life.74 There are three primary phases at which the violation of the
right to life occurs in the context of extra-judicial killings. The first
phase is in the planning of the killing; for example, stalking the victim,
or determining the areas in which the victim or members of a targeted
group might be vulnerable.75 The second phase is the actual act of
killing the victim, regardless of the method or manner used for this
purpose.76 Thus, both the killing of a disappeared person and the killing
of a targeted person in broad daylight would fall into this phase. And
the third phase—following the death of the victim, is the act of covering
up the state’s involvement in the death.77 This phase can involve any
number of state actors or quasi-state actors who planned the killing as
part of an overarching attempt to silence a particular victim, as in the
Myrna Mack Chang case.78 As with the Court’s construction of
violations of the right to life in the context of forced disappearances,
this phase extends beyond the death of the victim and emphasizes
respect for the victim post-mortem79.
In the context of extra-judicial killings, the Court has established
2–4 (Dec. 4, 1991); Mack Chang, supra note 40, ¶¶ 134.8–134.13; Escué-Zapata, supra note 48,
¶¶ 47–53; Kawas-Fernández v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 196 (Apr. 3, 2009); Chitay Nech, supra note 45; Gomes-Lund, supra note
46; Family Barrios v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 237 (Nov. 24, 2011).
72. See Gómez-Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 110 (July 8, 2004).
73. See id.; Aloeboetoe, supra note 71; Mack Chang, supra note 40; Escué-Zapata, supra
note 48; Kawa-Fernandez, supra note 71; Gomes-Lund, supra note 46; Family Barrios, supra
note 71.
74. See generally Aloeboetoe, supra note 71; Mack Chang, supra note 40; Escué -Zapata,
supra note 48; Kawa-Fernandez, supra note 71; Gomes-Lund, supra note 46; Family Barrios,
supra note 71.
75. The Court set out these phases in the Mack Chang case and then affirmed them in
subsequent cases. See Mack Chang, supra note 40; Kawas-Fernandez, supra note 71.
76. See Mack Chang, supra note 40.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
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that the ultimate responsibility for the preservation of the right to life
lies with the State and all of its actors, including police forces, military
groups, and para-military groups where appropriate.80 The Court has
concomitantly asserted that States are required to extend the terms of
their criminal laws to these actors and agents in order to stop the
potential for impunity.81
Further, the Court has been highly critical of police investigatory
practices when extra-judicial killings have been committed. The Court
noted that these practices often involve shoddy forensic investigatory
standards and a failure to properly document the type and nature of the
abuses committed against the victims prior to and including the fatal
act. 82 These investigatory failures—whether the result of a cover-up or
lack of resources—constitute an additional element of the violation of
the victim’s right to life even though the violations occurred postmortem.83
3. Children as Victims
Children are an extremely vulnerable group within the InterAmerican human rights system, regardless of where they live.84 This is
especially true given that many children in this region are quite poor, do
not live in a regular familial setting, live on the margins of societal
acceptance and inclusion, and thus are unable to avail themselves of
social or legal protections even where they do exist.85 Indeed, even in
instances where children and young adults live with their families, the
families are often unable to protect the lives of these children unless
they pay bribes or offer other inducements to state actors, especially in
the juvenile detention setting.86
The Court has dealt with several cases involving children during
the course of its jurisprudence. In these cases, the Court has consistently
found that States have a greater obligation to respect children’s right to

80. 19 Tradesmen v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, supra note 47, ¶¶ 152–55.
81. See id. ¶¶ 256–63.
82. See Servellón-García. v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 152, ¶ 2 (Sept. 21, 2006).
83. See id. ¶¶ 192–96.
84. Id. ¶¶ 105–06; see Laurence Burgogue-Larsen and Amaya Ubeda de Torres, THE INTERAMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, CARE LAW AND COMMENTARY (Rosalins Greenstein
trans.) 399, para. 16.09 (2011).
85. For an in-depth discussion of the issues facing children in Latin America, see InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, The Rights of the Child in the Inter-American Human
Rights System 2nd ed., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.133 Doc. 34 (Oct. 29, 2008).
86. See “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” v. Paraguay, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, ¶ 38(b) (Sept. 2, 2004).
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life due to the quintessential vulnerabilities of childhood and to the
existence of international protections for children, such as the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which nearly all state parties
have signed onto as a matter of law.87
Although the Court’s jurisprudence related to children is not as
copious as that relating to forced disappearances and extra-judicial
killings, it is essential to understanding the growth of right to life in the
Inter-American context. Children, as vulnerable and marginalized
members of society, must be given protections and allowed to live
unharmed within society. Protections must include not only the state
protecting children from society as a whole but also the state protecting
children from the state itself. This relates to the expansion of the right to
life to include respect for life as well as protection of life in the criminal
context. Understanding this distinction is critical to the next section of
this Part addressing indigenous communities. Respect for life is at the
heart of most issues relating to these communities, which are typically
marginalized within the mainstream of law and society and, thus, often
viewed as less important members of the state community.
An interesting sub-set of the rights of children in the Court’s right
to life jurisprudence is typified by the Gelman v Uruguay case.88 In that
case, a young married couple was disappeared by the regime in
Uruguay while Mrs. Gelman was in the later stages of pregnancy.89
After she delivered a baby girl, the baby was adopted out to members of
the regime.90 Following the birth, Mrs. Gelman’s fate became a mystery,
while it was established that Mr. Gelman died.91 Many years later, the
baby’s paternal grandfather located her and was able to confirm her real
identity.92 Ms. Gelman and her paternal grandfather brought a complaint
that ultimately reached the Court, alleging several violations of the
American Convention including the violation of Mrs. Gelman’s right to
life.93 The Court agreed with Ms. Gelman, finding that there had been a
violation of her mother’s right to life and also confirmed the State’s
pattern of abducting children from their “subversive” parents as a
recognized state practice.94
87. See “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ¶¶ 146–47, 185 (Nov. 19, 1999); Gómez-Paquiyauri, supra note 72,
¶¶ 162–70; Servellon-Garcia, supra note 82, at ¶¶ 113, 116.
88. See Gelman, supra note 68, ¶¶ 102, 121–132.
89. See id. ¶¶ 2, 80.
90. See id. ¶ 88.
91. See id. ¶¶ 83–84, 89, 96.
92. See id. ¶¶ 108–11.
93. See id. ¶ 119.
94. See Gelman, supra note 68, ¶¶ 44–47, 60.
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The Court’s decision in Gelman was an important step for
abducted children towards international recognition of violations of the
right to life suffered by their parents. These children are being given a
voice with which to indict the regime that destroyed their families.
Conversely, Contreras et al. v. El Salvador addressed claims
brought by parents and family members of children who were
disappeared in a concerted campaign of abductions of the children of
subversives in El Salvador between 1981 and1983.95 At the time of the
case, one of these children had been found alive and the rest were still
disappeared.96 The Court found that this violated the children’s right to
life due to the stated assumption that those who were long disappeared
were dead.97 Further, in Contreras, the Court explicitly stated that, while
all forced disappearances created a situation of vulnerability in which
the right to life could be implicated,
[t]his situation is accentuated in the presence of a systematic
pattern of human rights violations and when children are
involved, as in this case, given that the illegal removal of their
biological parents also jeopardizes the life, survival and
development of the children, the latter understood in its
broadest sense to include its physical, mental, spiritual, moral,
98
psychological, and social aspects.
4. Indigenous Communities
Indigenous communities have suffered many human rights
violations in the OAS region as a matter of historical and modern day
practice.99 The cases brought to the Court on behalf of these
communities have tended to focus on issues involving the targeting of
the indigenous community’s land and resources for development by the
State, without the meaningful input or consent of the community
itself;100 the failure of the State to provide basic services, such as access
to health care to members of the community;101 and the targeting of
95. See Contreras, supra note 44, ¶ 2.
96. See id. ¶¶ 90–94.
97. See id.
98. Id. ¶ 90.
99. See generally LAURENCE BURGORGUE-LARSEN & AMAYA ÚBEDA DE TORRES, THE
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, CASE LAW AND COMMENTARY (Rosalind
Greenstein trans., 2011) 500.
100. See Pueblo Indígena Kichwa de Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Fondo y reparaciones, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245 (June 27, 2012).
101. See Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 (June 17, 2005); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous
Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
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entire communities, or those advocating for the community, for either
their claimed political affiliations or simply for their indigenous
status.102 In all of these scenarios, the Court has found the right to life to
be implicated. This is perhaps not surprising in the context of
jurisprudence regarding violence against members of indigenous
communities. However, the Court’s extension of the right to life into
these other areas is groundbreaking and noteworthy in the discussion of
the overall parameters of the right to life.
In the Yakye Axa Community case, the Court established that the
right to life “encompasses not only the right of every human being not
to be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life but also the right not to be
denied the conditions required to ensure a decent existence.”103 This
concept of a “decent existence” is deeply connected to the idea of
dignity on behalf of the individual and the community, and requires the
State to ensure that conditions exist in which dignity is protected,
preserved, and promoted.104 Dignity, as a subset of the right to life, is
broadly applicable and the Court is adamant that it applies to indigenous
communities and community members regardless of their social status,
economic status, or isolation from the larger national community.105
The Court also places the burden on the State to take “positive,
concrete measures geared towards fulfillment of the right to a decent
life for indigenous communities—especially in the case of persons who
are vulnerable and at risk, whose care becomes a high priority within
the understanding of the right to life and what it entails.”106 The Yakye
Axa Community case and its holdings were revolutionary in that they
mark the first time that the Court explained the right to life in such an
expansive way, extending well beyond the scope of protection from
violent state action. 107
Further, in Yakye Axa Community, the Court explicitly linked the
right to life with the right to health, the right to food, and the right to
access clean water.108 All of these rights are implicated in the idea of

No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006); Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214 (Aug. 24, 2010).
102. See Mack Chang, supra note 41; Escue-Zapata, supra note 48; Chitay Nech, supra note
45.
103. Yakya Axa Indigenous Community, supra note 101, ¶ 157.
104. Id. ¶¶ 161–62.
105. Id.
106. Id. ¶ 162.
107. See, e.g., Burgorgue-Larsen & de torres, supra note 99, at 509; see also Keener, infra
note 151, at 596–97.
108. Yakya Axa Indigenous Community, supra note 101, ¶ 167.
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the right to a decent living.109 The Court also linked these rights to the
right to cultural identity and education, especially for indigenous
communities that derive so much of their identity from cultural
practices and beliefs.110
The Yakye Axa Community case was followed by other cases
involving indigenous communities that have endorsed and furthered the
Court’s ruling and expanded the contours of the right to life even
further.
In Sawhoyamaxa Community, for example, the Court
unequivocally stated that:
the states must adopt any measures that may be necessary to
create an adequate statutory framework to discourage any
threat to the right to life; to establish an effective system of
administration of justice able to investigate, punish and repair
any deprivation of lives by state agents, or by individuals; and
to protect the right of not being prevented from access to
conditions that may guarantee a decent life, which entails the
adoption of positive measures to prevent the breach of such
111
right.
The Sawhoyamaxa Court went on to add those who have been
excluded from society in general and those who are extremely poor to
the list of those who require special assistance ensuring that their right
to life is respected by the national community and the State at large.112
Despite these protections, the Court has been reluctant to hold the
State responsible for violations of the right to life in instances where
members of an indigenous community have died due to the inability to
access health care, food, and clean water without a significant causal
connection.113 In these instances, the Court reasoned that it was
impossible to establish whether the deaths of these community members
were the direct result of State inaction.114
There are, however, some exceptions to this reasoning. In
Sawhoyamaxa Community, for example, the Court found that conditions
in the community were so egregious that the State should have foreseen
that some community members would die as a result.115 In order to
evaluate whether deprivations of these components of the right to life
are sufficiently deplorable, the Court has established a state actor
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Sawhoyamaxa Community, supra note 101, ¶ 153.
Id. ¶ 154.
Id. ¶ 155.
Id. ¶¶ 156–58.
Id. ¶¶ 158–59.
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foreseeability and knowledge requirement.116 This entails the state party
having reasonable knowledge of the situation giving rise to the potential
violation—such as the provision of insufficient water resources to
sustain the community—and it being foreseeable that this situation
would result in conditions that amount to a violation of the right to
life.117 The Court’s rationale for developing this standard was to ensure
that an onerous burden was not placed on the State such that it would be
responsible for every loss of life, while at the same time ensuring that
States acted in a way in compliance with the essential aspects of the
right to life for all members of society, especially those identified as
vulnerable.118
Later, the Court would go further in Xakmok Kasek Community by
explaining that it would evaluate the claims brought by the Xakmok
Kasek Community against the State of Paraguay using a standard that
balanced the ways in which the State sought to protect the Xakmok
Kasek Community against the State’s “duty to guarantee the right to life
of the members of the Xákmok Kásek Community.”119 This
determination focused on two sub-categories of the right to life—the
right to a dignified existence, and the State’s international responsibility
for the social situation, which the Xakmok Kasek Community alleged
caused its members' deaths.120
In order to make a determination as to the right to a dignified
existence, the Court looked at the ability of the Xakmok Kasek
Community to access water and the quality of the water itself,121 its
access to food—including the nutritional quality and quantity of food
provided by the State,122 its access to permanent healthcare services,123
and its access to education in appropriate educational facilities.124
Overall, the Court agreed with Xakmok Kasek Community members
who stated that, in light of their state-dependent existence due to their
disassociation from their traditional lands, Paraguay had not guaranteed
the right to a dignified existence as part of the right to life under the
American Convention.125
116. Sawhoyamaxa Community, supra note 101, ¶ 155.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Xakmok Kasek Community, supra note 101, ¶ 193.
120. See id.
121. Id. ¶¶ 195–96.
122. Id. ¶¶ 197–202.
123. Id. ¶¶ 203–08.
124. Id. ¶¶ 209–17.
125. Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 215 (Aug. 24, 2010).
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In order to determine State responsibility for the deaths of Xakmok
Kasek Community members, the Court observed that the decision
would be made on a historical basis.126 Current measures taken by the
State would not, on their own, be sufficient to avoid responsibility for
violations of the right to life.127 State culpability for deaths of Xakmok
Kasek Community members would stem from a perspective that allows
for the consideration of factors such as 1) the situation of extreme and
particular vulnerability within the community and for the victims, 2) the
cause of death of the victims, and 3) the corresponding causal link
between them to be connected, without placing on the State the undue
burden of overcoming an indeterminate or unknown risk.128
The Court then analyzed the deaths that the Xakmok Kasek
Community claimed were attributable to the State’s violation of the
right to life. It found that these violations did in fact occur with regard
to medical care provided to ill members of the Xakmok Kasek
Community, mainly infants and children.129 What is particularly notable
is that the Court went beyond the idea of general rights to food, water
and health and included access to food, access to acceptable quality
water, and access to health services as part of the right to a dignified
existence.130
However, it should be noted that where the indigenous
community’s primary right to life claims are based on the deprivation of
property rights, rather than the deprivation of resources, the Court has
been reluctant to find violations of the right to life per se.131 Instead, the
Court has historically relied on the property rights protections of the
American Convention to find the State in violation and attempted to
craft meaningful remedies for the affected indigenous communities.132
While the Xakmok Kasek Community case is of interest for many
reasons, it is important to developing an understanding of the right to
life because it illustrates how the Court extended the parameters of the
right to life while also ensuring that States are not categorically imputed
with knowledge—and therefore responsibility—without evidence of a
causal relationship.
The Court’s latest decision involving indigenous communities,

126. Id. ¶ 227.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. ¶ 234.
130. Id. ¶ 259.
131. See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001).
132. See id.
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Pueblo Indigena Kichwa de Sarayaku v. Ecuador, featured arguments
that the Stategenerally violated the right to life of the Pueblo Indigena
Kichwa de Sarayaku by allowing explosives to be used as part of the
land-clearing phase of a contested oil exploration project, and noted
several specific instances of deaths allegedly due to these measures.133
However, the Court again attempted to temper the parameters of its
positive right to life jurisdiction by reiterating that the provision should
be made
“when the authorities knew or should have known about the
existence of a situation of real and immediate risk to the life
of an individual or group of specific individuals, and did not
take the necessary measures within the scope of their
authority which could reasonably be expected to prevent or
134
avoid such risk.
In order to decide the issues facing it, the Court examined the
actions of the oil company that planted the explosives in and around the
Pueblo Indigena Kichwa de Sarayaku’s lands and the State’s
compliance with an earlier order to cease this conduct during the
pendency of the case.135 Ultimately, the Court found that the State had
placed the lives of the Pueblo Indigena Kichwa de Sarayaku members in
jeopardy by allowing these actions to continue, which was a violation of
the Pueblo Indigena Kichwa de Sarayaku’s right to life along with other
property rights.136
5. Prison Inmates as Victims
The Court’s jurisprudence on prison inmates is rather thin;
nevertheless it does establish that there is higher burden on the State to
protect those who are incarcerated because the State has assumed the
role of guarantor for their safety and survival.137 This includes adducing
a state requirement to protect the inmate’s right to life, particularly
where the inmate is an incarcerated child.138 As the Court stated in
Juvenile Re-education Institute v. Paraguay:

133. See Pueblo Indígena, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 245, supra note 100.
134. Id. ¶ 245.
135. Id. ¶ 248.
136. Id. ¶ 249.
137. See “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” v. Paraguay, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, supra note 86, ¶¶ 152–55; Pacheco Teruel et al. v. Honduras, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 241, ¶¶ 67–69 (Apr. 27,
2012).
138. See “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” v. Paraguay, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, supra note 86, ¶¶ 161–62.
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[I]n the case of the right to life, when the person the State
deprives of his or her liberty is a child . . . it has the same
obligations it has regarding to any person, yet compounded by
the added obligation established in Article 19 of the American
Convention. On the one hand, it must be all the more diligent
and responsible in its role as guarantor and must take special
measures based on the principle of the best interests of the
child. On the other hand, to protect a child’s life, the State
must be particularly attentive to that child’s living conditions
while deprived of his or her liberty, as the child’s detention or
imprisonment does not deny the child his or her right to life or
139
restrict that right.
C. The Right to Life and Reparations
Just as the Court has established a broad and more encompassing
definition of the right to life and its parameters, the Court has also
established a widely encompassing standard for how to award
reparations for victims of human rights abuses, particularly the right to
life.
Perhaps the standard form of reparation for any human rights
violation takes the form of pecuniary awards.140 The Court has
established that there is a place for awarding pecuniary damages in
instances where the right to life has been violated because it is
impossible to restore the life of the victims in these instances.141 In
deciding the amount of pecuniary damages to award, the Court has
included lost wages over the expected wage-earning life of the victim
and other indirect financial losses.142
When calculating pecuniary damages, the Court has taken a more
holistic view of the potential class of award recipients, particularly with
respect to members of indigenous communities that have a different
familial structure.143 While the Court has required that there be a
definitive cut-off point for awardees after a certain degree of removal
from the victim, it has traditionally allowed local custom—including
139. Id. ¶ 160.
140. See, e.g., Chitay Nech, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 212, supra note 45, ¶¶ 69–71; Contreras,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 232, ¶¶ 222–25; Escué-Zapata, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 165, ¶¶ 132–46.
141. Aloeboetoe, supra note 71, ¶ 46 (“[I]n matters involving violations of the right to life . . .
reparation must of necessity be in the form of pecuniary compensation, given the nature of the
right violated . . . insofar as the right to life is concerned, it is impossible to reinstate the
enjoyment of that right to the victims. In such cases, reparation must take other, alternative forms,
such as pecuniary compensation. This compensation refers primarily to actual damages
suffered.”).
142. See id. ¶¶ 89–92.
143. See id. ¶¶ 63–64.
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practices of indigenous communities—to be used in calculating the
damages awarded.144 This can be seen as an expansion of the
understanding of life in the Inter-American human rights system
because it evaluates the impact of the victim’s life in the context of her
identity and role in a larger community, rather than a formulaic view of
the victim’s life based solely on majoritarian community structures.
The Court has routinely awarded non-pecuniary—or, moral—
damages as reparations in cases involving violations of the right to
life.145 In addition to the monetary aspects of non-pecuniary damage
awards, the Court has been creative in crafting remedies that seek to
honor the life of the victim and to commemorate the suffering to which
the victim was subjected. Examples of this include the use of public
monuments commemorating the victim, especially the use of plaques
that indicate the exact spot where the victim was either disappeared or
murdered, and the use of video documentaries that explain and honor
the victim’s life and work, which is often the very reason that the victim
was targeted.146
IV. LIFE AS WE KNOW IT NOW AND IN THE FUTURE
A. Life as We Know It Now
From the fairly simplistic notion of a protection from the
deprivation of an individual’s life by a state actor in the penal context,
the right to life in the Inter-American human rights system has rapidly
expanded in scope through the jurisprudence of the Court. As discussed
above, the Court has increasingly used the right to life as a tool to
address many forms of state action—or lack thereof—which has formed
the crux of many human rights violations taken by States against
individuals outside of the penal context. Indeed, even where the Court
has addressed violations of the right to life in the context of prison
inmates, it has expanded the scope of the right to life to include a State
responsibility to guarantee the inmate’s right to life as well as associated
protections, such as adequate housing and medical assistance.147
As a threshold matter, the Court has provided insight on the
responsibilities and duties of states under the concept of protecting the
right to life by establishing both negative and positive elements for the
right. The negative aspect of the right requires that the State ensure that

144.
145.
146.
147.

See id. ¶¶ 82–84, 96–98.
For a discussion of these forms of reparations see Harrington, supra note 29.
See id.
"Juvenile Reeducation Institute," supra note 86, ¶¶ 155, 159, 170.
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individuals are not arbitrarily deprived of their lives. The positive aspect
of the right is “that the States adopt all appropriate measures to protect
and preserve the right to life.”148 Further, the Court has extended state
responsibility beyond standard state actors and to the acts of local
officials as well as quasi-state actors such as paramilitary
organizations.149
Both individually and collectively, these negative and positive
aspects of the right to life have served as the guides within which the
Court has begun to fashion the contours of the right. This is particularly
important in terms of the positive aspect of the right to life, since this is
the aspect that the Court often uses to justify the inclusion of non-penal
protections, such as access to adequate food and healthcare services for
indigenous communities.150 The ability to use this aspect of the right to
life in a creative manner has allowed the Court to move further into the
realm of what constitutes the essential materials for and needs of life.151
This movement has emboldened individuals, communities and
those who represent them, as well as the Commission, to bring
complaints that at first might seem outside the scope of the right to life.
It has provided room to explore the legal parameters of the right to life
and established the right to life as a thick area of jurisprudence at the
Court level. This was seen above by the coupling of issues relating to
the right to life and the rights of the child within the American
Convention and Inter-American human rights system, as the rights of
the child jurisprudence is arguably much thinner and less nuanced.152
The Court has recognized two forms of violent state action against
individuals−or communities−which rise to the level of violations of the
right to life: the use of forced disappearances and the use of extrajudicial killings by state actors or quasi-state actors.153 These two forms
of violation have been constant throughout the Court’s jurisprudence;
however, over time the Court has established a near presumption that
148. Mack Chang, supra note 41, ¶¶ 92–93.
149. See generally id. See also Mapiripan Massacre: "Mapiripan Massacre" v. Colombia,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, ¶ 197 (Sept. 15,
2005); Ituango Massacre: Ituango Massacres v. Colombia. Preliminary Objection, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment , Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148, ¶ 125 (July 1, 2006)
(describing the paramilitary groups' involvement in the massacre).
150. Yakye Axa, supra note 101, ¶ 221.
151. Steven R. Keener & Javier Vasquez, A Life Worth Living: Enforcement of the Right to
Health Through the Right to Life in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 40 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 595, 597 (2008).
152. See "Juvenile Reeducation Institute," supra note 86, ¶ 172.
153. See, e.g., Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala, supra note 45, ¶ 96; "Mapiripan Massacre" v.
Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, ¶¶
157–62 (Sept. 15, 2005).
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forced disappearance will equate to extra-judicial killing where the fate
of the disappeared person is unknown and the state cannot, or will not,
provide information on this.154 Combined with Court presumptions
regarding the occurrence of forced disappearances and extra-judicial
killings under certain regimes, in certain States, and at certain times,
these near-presumptions create a situation in which victims and the
Commission have a stronger ability to adequately prove the existence of
one or both of these crimes—even where information on individual
cases is not readily available.
The importance of this combination can be seen in Court cases
stating that forced disappearances are violations of the right to life
because there is no evidence to support the fact that the disappeared
person might still be alive.155 This combination is also important in the
sphere of extra-judicial killings because these acts have historically
been carried out by unknown state actors or quasi-state actors, thus
raising the possibility that the victim’s representatives would be unable
to make the causal connection to the state that is needed to effectively
assert state responsibility and find justice for the murdered
individual(s).156
Of particular jurisprudential importance is that the right to life,
according to the Court, does not end with the life of the victim himself.
The Court has established that the right to life continues to be violated
when the remains of victims of forced disappearance and subsequent
extra-judicial killings are intentionally hidden from society—and
particularly from the victim’s family—for any period of time.157
Stressing the importance of this ongoing violation, in these situations,
the Court has routinely ordered the implicated State to locate and return
the remains of disappeared persons to their families, thereby preserving
the dignity of the victim and his life.158
In the context of extra-judicial killings, the Court has created three
phases in which the right to life can be violated: 1) the phase in which
the murder is planned; 2) the phase in which the murder is carried out;
and 3) the phase in which the implicated state actors or quasi-state
actors attempt to cover-up the murder.159 Thus, the right to life can

154. See Godínez-Cruz v. Honduras, Merits. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 5, at ¶
165 (Jan. 20, 1989).
155. See id.; see also Molina-Theissen v. Guatemala, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 108, ¶ 91(a) (July 3, 2004).
156. See Mack Chang, supra note 41, ¶¶ 273–75.
157. See id.
158. See Contreras et al. v. El Salvadore, supra note 6, ¶ 201.
159. See Mack Chang, supra note 41, ¶¶ 141, 145, 149.
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continue to be violated after the murder of the individual when the
subsequent acts form a nexus with the murder.
Throughout its jurisprudence, the Court has expanded the
parameters of the right to life in relationship to particularly vulnerable
groups within society, particularly children, women, and indigenous
communities.160 The Court has mirrored its phases of right to life
violations in the extra-judicial killing context where women and girls
have been subject to sustained disappearance and murder by non-state
actors because the state was found not to have acted effectively at the
time that the victims were reported missing, during the investigation
into their deaths, and in the prosecution of those who allegedly
committed crimes against the victims. Each of these phases was
implicated as a separate violation of the right to life.161
Children have been identified as being particularly vulnerable to
state actions overall and particularly to actions that effect their lives.162
In this way, the Court has expanded the concept of the right to life to
take into account the vulnerability of, and need to respect, the lives of
children as well as the simple need to preserve their lives against
arbitrary punishment.163 Further, children have been acknowledged as
suffering right to life violations where they were abducted from their
families as part of a concerted campaign to remove the children of
“subversives” from their parents.164 Although some of these children
have been located and reunited with their family members, complaints
regarding those who have not yet been found have generated violations
of the right to life based on the already established connection between
forced disappearance and death.165 The Court has also allowed a found
abducted child to bring a complaint regarding the fate of her mother as a
violation of the mother’s right to life which, this article asserts, is a
validation of the life of the child as part of the family from which she
was abducted.166
Perhaps the most innovative area of the Court’s right to life
jurisprudence involves the duties and responsibilities that a State owes
to indigenous communities located within its territory. Certainly, the

160. See, e.g., The Rights of the Child in the Inter-American Human Rights System, supra
note 85, at 44.
161. Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, (Nov. 16, 2009).
162. See Harrington, supra note 29.
163. See "Juvenile Reeducation Institute," supra note 86, ¶¶ 147, 160, 161.
164. Gelman v. Uruguay, supra note 68, ¶ 130.
165. Id. ¶ 158.
166. See id. ¶¶ 96, 130–32.
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Court’s jurisprudence and expanded parameters regarding forced
disappearances and extra-judicial killings are applicable to these
communities due to the many acts of violence which have been
committed against members of these communities by state or quasi-state
actors.167 What is more novel, however, is the way in which the Court
has established the rights that indigenous communities possess as part
of the bundle of rights that fall within the ambit of the right to life
overall.
Some observers have explained the development of the rights that
compose this bundle—and the attendant duties and responsibilities
owed by the State—as the Court incorporating economic, social and
cultural rights into the right to life.168 This conclusion is understandable
and notable; nevertheless, it does not fully reflect the impact of the
Court’s jurisprudence in this area because it seeks to create a dichotomy
between the rights that are in this bundle, namely between those that are
civil and political, and those that are economic, social, and cultural.169
Rather than as a dichotomy, it is better to understand the Court’s
jurisprudence as a cohesive acceptance of the rights, duties, and
responsibilities surrounding indigenous communities. This underscores
the interconnectedness of all of these rights, duties, and responsibilities
in the same way that the community functions as a societal unit. Seen
this way, each right is recognizable as a thread in the tapestry that is the
right to life. Just as the loss of a thread will unravel a tapestry, so too
will the enjoyment of the right to life unravel when one of its threads is
broken.
For example, the Court has recognized that the right to life
includes the right to a decent existence, which includes State
recognition of individual dignity. Thus far, the Court has found that
this right includes the right to health—encompassing the ability to
physically access healthcare services—the right to food, and the right of

167. See Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001); Case of
the Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, (ser. C) No. 124 (June 15, 2005); Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v.
Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, (ser. C) No. 125 (June 17, 2005); Case of the
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment,
(ser. C) No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006).
168. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Right to a Dignified Life (Vida Digna): The Integration of
Economic and Social Rights with Civil and Political Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights
System, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2008); Monica Feria Tinta, Justiciability of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System of Protection of Human
Rights: Beyond Traditional Paradigms and Notions, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 431 (2007).
169. See id.
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access to clean water.170 The Court has also made direct links between
the right to life and the rights to education and cultural identity.171 These
are all elements that allow the community to exist and flourish
alongside protections against physical violence and forced
disappearance.
In its latest piece of jurisprudence regarding indigenous
communities, the Court established that the right to life includes
protection from State and private action, done with the permission of
the State, which results in harm to an indigenous community.172
Specifically, the Court looked at the harm that resulted from the use of
explosives for land clearing when the State had knowledge of the
dangers to the community and failed to protect against them.173 By
expanding the articulated parameters of the right to life under the
American Convention, the Court recognized the potential damages to
the entire community—physically and economically—that stemmed
from these measures.174 Again, the tapestry is unraveling because of
pulled threads.
B. Pending Cases and Future Jurisprudence
In recent years, the Commission has submitted a number of cases
to the Court that arguably present the Court with opportunities to further
refine the parameters of the right to life under the American
Convention. Given the evolution of the right to life as charted in this
article, it is important to examine these new cases in order to understand
where the next contours of the right to life might be developed.
Some cases raise issues of forced disappearance and extra-judicial
killings that are sadly similar to the facts of many of the Court’s
previous cases.175 Maria Isabel Veliz Franco v. Guatemala presents a
situation factually similar to the Cotton Field case from Mexico. It
involves the disappearance and murder of a girl in an area of Guatemala
where there is an alleged pattern of violence against women and a
culture of impunity as a result.176 Veliz Franco presented the Court with

170. Yakye Axa Indigenous Community, supra note 101.
171. Id.
172. Pueblo Indígena, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 245, supra note 100, ¶¶ 244–45.
173. Id. ¶¶ 244–46.
174. Id. ¶ 246.
175. See Mendoza v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 247, ¶¶ 28-30 (Sept. 3, 2011); Joe Luís Castillo González et al. v. Venezuela, Case
12.605, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 120/10, OEA/Ser.L./V (2011).
176. Franco v. Guatemala, Admissibility Report, Report No. 92/06, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Case No. 12.578 (Oct. 21, 2006).
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the opportunity to further enunciate the right to life as it applies to
women and girls in the face of the failure of the Cotton Field decision.
In Veliz Franco, the Court could set a meaningful precedent by
condemning the violence and discrimination against women and girls
either in Mexico—the state implicated in the Cotton Field decision—or
other states within the Inter-American human rights system.177 It could
also have resulted in the Court re-addressing the role of systematic
tolerance of violations of the right to life, allowing future violations to
occur.
In Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez et al (Chavin de Huántar
Operation) v. Peru, the Court was asked to examine a case of extrajudicial killing.178 This killing involved a terrorist group widely
recognized as a state threat by the state military forces, in the aftermath
of a military operation to free hostages taken by members of the
group.179 The deceased was one of the hostages taken.180 Many novel
legal issues are presented in Cruz Sanchez, and the balancing of the
right to life with state interests in security, and indeed the interests of
those who were being held hostage by the deceased, ranks highly
among them.
A number of cases referred by the Commission relate to massacres
by state actors or quasi-state actors. These cases present the Court the
opportunity to create quasi-presumptions regarding the political and
military climate existing in the implicated States during specific
periods. In Nadege Dorzama et al, Massacre of Guayubin v. Dominican
Republic, the Commission referred a complaint alleging that Haitian
state actors used excessive force against the Haitian claimants because
of their Haitian identity.181 This case will require the Court to address
assertions regarding the use of force and the right to life as well as,
arguably, the connection between the right to life and violent state
actions that are targeted against a particular nationality and ethnic
group.182
Some of these cases relate to massacres of populations in areas that
177. See
Press
Release
60/12,
Inter-Am.
Comm’n
H.R.,
IACHR Takes Case on Guatemala to the IA Court HR (June 7, 2012); González et al. (“Cotton
Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 59, at ¶ 2.
178. Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez et al. (Chavin de Huántar Operation) v. Peru,
Admissibility Report, Report No. 13/04, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Case No. 12.444 (Feb. 27,
2004).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, Merits, Reparation, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 251 (Oct. 24, 2012).
182. See id.
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the State targeted because they were near suspected anti-government
force strongholds.183
Other cases relate to specific targeting of certain indigenous
community groups—especially women and childrenfor forced
disappearance, grotesque torture, and extra-judicial killings, largely due
to allegations that these communities in some way had ties to antigovernment groups.184 The Court will be called upon to address these
massacres under its already-established right to life jurisprudence, and
again will have to examine the issue of State attempts to secure the
population against militant groups and the legitimacy of these claims.
Additionally, in Community of Rio Negro of the Maya Achi People
and Its Members v. Guatemala, the Court will address the
Commission’s assertions that Guatemala’s violations of the right to life
against community members were so egregious and targeted toward the
decimation of the particular community that they rose to the level of
genocide.185 This determination will doubtless provide new contours to
the right to life under the American Convention regardless of the
Court’s decision. On the one hand, a finding that genocide did indeed
occur will vastly expand the boundaries of the right to life within the
Inter-American human rights system. On the other hand, a finding that
the acts did not rise to the level of genocide will ensure that the right to
life within the Inter-American human rights system will remain
relatively static within the face of grave massacres. Either way, the right
to life, and the Inter-American human rights system generally, will be
impacted in a meaningful way.
While it is impossible to predict the Court’s decisions in any of
these pending cases, they all represent important opportunities for the
Court to solidify, reinforce, and expand its right to life jurisprudence.
Although the content of the Court’s future jurisprudence is unknown, it
is certain that this jurisprudence will further the understanding of the
right to life as we know it.

183. See Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Admissibility Report, Report No. 25/03,
Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Case No. 12.416 (Mar. 6, 2003); El Mozote Massacre v. El Salvador,
Admissibility Report, Report No. 24/06, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Case No. 10.720 (Mar. 2,
2006).
184. See José Migues Gudiel Álvarez and Others (“Diario Militar”) v. Guatemala,
Admissibility Report, Report No. 116/10, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Case No. 12.590 (Oct. 22,
2010); Edgar Fernando García v. Guatemala, Admissibility Report, Report No. 91/06, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Case No. 12.343 (Oct. 21, 2006).
185. See Community Masacres de Río Negro v. Guatemala, Preliminary Exceptions, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 250 (Sept. 4, 2012).
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V. CONCLUSION
Throughout its history, the Court has steadily developed
jurisprudence in connection with the right to life. This development has
resulted in the Court fashioning an understanding of the right to life that
is protective and inclusive, going beyond protections in the penal
context to afford protections to those who are frequently victimized
within the State and regarded as voiceless within society. In so doing,
the Court has provided a vision of the right to life that is uniquely
holistic and can be developed in the future in order to validate the many
facets of life. Thus, the Court, in expanding the jurisprudence relating to
and boundaries of the right to life, has given us the current
understanding of life as we know it, and has highlighted the evolving
nature of the right to life as an inclusive and comprehensive tool.

